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Resurgent Serbian Nationalism: Six Centuries After Kosovo
Polje
Summary: This week's celebrations of a major new
cathedral and of the 600th anniversary of the
destruction of the medieval Serbian
empire
embody the positive and negative
aspects of
Serbian nationalism.

* * *
Manifestations of Serbian nationalism have been reflected
this week in separate but related events. On Sunday, June 25,
the world's largest functioning Orthodox cathedral, Saint Sava,
was inaugurated in Belgrade. Three days later, Serbs throughout
Yugoslavia are celebrating the 600th anniversary of the battle
of Kosovo Polje, or the Field of Blackbirds, a Serbian defeat
that sealed Ottoman rule over Serbia and much of the rest of the
Balkans for the next 500 years. Both these observances, and the
circumstances leading up to and surrounding them, exhibit both
the positive aspects and the dangers that have accompanied the
surge in Serbian nationalism fostered over at least the past
year by the Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic.
Construction began on the cathedral of Saint Sava in 1935
but was halted by the German invasion of Yugoslavia in 1941.
Shortly after the end of the war, the hierarchy of the Serbian
Orthodox Church began a series of repeated, but fruitless,
appeals to the Yugoslav government for permission to resume work
on the building. Only with the death of Tito in 1980 and the
removal of his firm grip on Yugoslav politics in general and on
such potentially contentious issues as religious and nati.onal
aspirations in particular did there appear any likelihood of
gaining official approval for resuming the project. Finally, in
1984, permission was granted and work began again.
Saint Sava's Cathedral has come to represent for Serbs
their perception of themselves as triumphant in the face of
repression.
It was on the site of the new church that the
Ottoman Turks burned the remains of Saint Sava, who is regarded
as the founder of the Serbian Orthodox Church. By this act the
Ottoman rulers were symbolically destroying not only Sava's
religious
influence
in Serbia but also
preventing
the
continuation of the Serbian cultural or political tradition.
Thus, since its inception, the attempt to build a church on this
site has constituted an assertion of Serbian nationalism. In
response, Serbs around the world have rallied to support the
project.
The construction has
been financed entirely by
voluntary
donations,
including
considerable
sums
from
individuals in the United States and Canada.
Although the cathedral will not be finished until 1992,
enough work had been completed to enable the patriarch to hold
the first service as scheduled on June 26. Beneath a 4,000-ton
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cupola that took 20 days to be raised into place and before
about 12,000 people inside the cathedral (including the daughter
of the Prince Regent of Yugoslavia at the outbreak of the Second
World War) and more than 100,000 outside, Patriarch German,
accompanied by all the Serbian Orthodox bishops, conducted a
service lasting 3 hours. 1 Almost on the eve, therefore, of a
most important anniversary, a monument to the Serbs' sense of
pride and renewal was inaugurated in Belgrade.
Three days after the first service in the cathedral, Serbs
throughout Yugoslavia and in Kosovo Polje are celebrating the
600th anniversary (June 28) of the Ottomnns' defeat of the
medieval Serbian state. Those papers that support Milosevic
have thoroughly publicized the event in a highly nationalistic
spirite
True, various Serbian and Yugoslav officials have
attempted over the last year or so to reassure the other
Yugoslav nationalities that Kosovo Polje is an anniversary not
just for Serbs but one that commemorates a decisive date in the
history of the entire Balkans, and even of the West and
Christendom as a whole, and that it should thus be celebrated by
all Yugoslavs. These attempts appear to have had only limited
success, however, although representatives of the Croatian
Catholic Church attended the service at Saint Sava's Cathedral
and many representatives of the government, the League of
Communists of Yugoslavia, and various Yugoslav organizations
have taken part in the festivities.
June 28 is, moreover, the anniversary of two other events
in Yugoslav history. In 1948 on this date Stalin cast Yugoslavia
out of the Cominform, thereby cutting it off from the bloc and
forcing it to develop an alternative model of communism. Perhaps
more important, it was on 28 June 1914 that Gavrilo Princip, a
nationalist Serbian student, assassinated the Hapsburg Archduke
Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, triggering off the chain of events
that led to the outbreak of World War I. The student radicals
wanted the Hapsburgs out
of
Bosnia-Herzegovina,
which the
nationalists claimed for Serbia, and were particularly incensed
that the archduke had chosen June 28 to visit the town, which
they took as a provocationo Against this background it is
perhaps not surprising that some other nationalities are a
little
uneasy
about
the prospect
of
massive
Serbian
demonstrations on this day.
Serbia's State President Slobodan Milosevic has become the
focal point for others' fears of Serbian nationalism~
He is
perceived as having
manipulated
and directed the recent
successful attempts to reassert Serbian control over
the
predominantly ethnj_c Albanian province of Kosovo, the population
of which is now about 90% Albanian but which is also the
traditional heart of medieval Serbia and the location of the
battle of Kosovo Polje in 1389. In the process, he has widely
been seen at home and abroad as having fanned nationalist
sentiments among Serbs in order to increase his own personal
clout, as well as to advance the power of Serbia within the
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Yugoslav federation.
Milosevic's most vehement detractors,
especially in Slovenia and Croatia, depict him as a hard-line
Stalinist on party matters and a fighter for Serbian ~omination
of the rest of Yugoslavia.
It is true that Milosevic has advocated market-oriented
economic reforms; but his overall image remains that of a
demagogue, nationalist, and dogmatist.
Even within Serbia he
has recently come under attack. On June 22 the Committee for
the Defense of Freedom of Thought and Expression, a group of
nonconformist
Serbian intellectuals, condemned the Serbian
authorities' treatment of ethnic Albanian prisoners in Kosovo;
their censure was aimed implicitly at Milosevic. 2
Since
Milosevic is regarded by many Yugoslavs as the personification
of aggressive Serbian nationalism, the speech he is to make
today will be studied widely
for clues as to his future
political course, which is bound to affect not only Serbia but
all of Yugoslavia as well.
David Goodlett
1

Vecernje Novosti (Belgrade), 26 June 1989.

2

Borba (Belgrade), 22 June 1989.
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Milosevic's Speech at Kosovo Polje

Slobodan Milosevic's speech at Kosovo
Polje on the 600th anniversary of the defeat of
the Serbian Army by the Ottoman Turks seems
relatively mild for a man known as an aggressive
and uncompromising politician.
Swnmary:

* * *
Serbia's State
President
Slobodan
Milosevic
clearly
captured the nationalistic mood (which the media, controlled by
his supporters, had fostered) at the celebrations on June 28
commemorating the 600th anniversary of the defeat of the Serbian
Army by the Ottoman Turks at the Battle of Kosovo Polje, also
known as the Battle of the Field of the Blackbirds. Although he
stressed the Serbs' pride in their history and made some
historical and other allusions that could hardly have gone down
well with Kosovo's Albanian majority, Milosevic's speech was
nonetheless relatively mild compared with past speeches in which
he
had strongly criticized his political opponents.
His
intolerant approach in the past had led many people to beli.eve
that he would renew or engage in new attacks on political
leaders who differed with his views on Serbia's statehood and on
political
and economic reform; apart from the
generally
nationalistic vein of his remarks, however, he was not as
aggressive as some might have expected.
There were obvious signs, however, that the celebration
also served as a kind of political rally. According to Radio
Ljubljana, thousands of photographs and posters of Milosevic
were displayed, but not one of Tito. The radio commentator also
remarked that the celebration indicated "an obvious national
rallying of Serbs" and that the Serbs "worship [Milosevic] like
the legendary Prince Lazar," who died at the Battle of Kosovo
Polje. Milosevic memorabilia were being sold; and several times
during his speech the crowds chanted his nickname, "Slobo,
Slobo. " 1
Many Serbs will undoubtedly long remember the event as a
day when Serbs throughout Yugoslavia and from North America and
Western Europe assembled to commemorate the most celebrated date
in Serbia's history. About 1,000,000 people probably attended
the ceremonies, although estimates of the size of the crowd
ranged from 600,000 to 1,600,000.
About 1,000 reporters (900
domestic and 100 foreign) covered the events.
Top political
figures from throughout
Yugoslavia
as well as 50 foreign
ambassadors attended the ceremonies. The leaders of the four
major religious denominations in Yugoslavia, the Serbian and
Macedonian Orthodox and the Roman Catholic churches and Islam
were also present. 2
For
Yugoslavia's
ethnic Albanian minority,
however,
Milosevic's speech offered no hope of reconciliation with the
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Serbs, Yugoslavia's largest ethnic group. Ethnic Albanians make
up almost 90% of Kosovo's population. Despite the fact that the
Serbian media and the organizing committee for th~ celebrations
went to some lengths to point out that the Battle of Kosovo
Polje had involved an alliance of Serbs, Albanians, Bulgarians,
Croats, and Hungarians against the Ottoman Turks, the overall
tone of the celebrations was more narrowly nationalistic and
these groups were virtually excluded from the festivities. Nor
did Milosevic explicitly make reference to these ethnic groups,
although he did speak of the importance of mutual "accord
. . . among all citizens living in Serbia, regardless of their
nationality or religion." Most ethnic Albanians would find that
hard to believe, given the fact that for decades they have felt
like second-class citizens in Yugoslavia.
Both Yugoslav and
Western press reports indicated that Kosovo's ethnic Albanians
had boycotted the ceremonies. 3
In short, the entire program,
which had been carefully worked out in every detail, including
the political overtones, was the greatest celebration of Serbian
nationalism in recent memory.
Besides being, in his official capacity, the most important
man in Serbia, Milosevic is undoubtedly also both the most
prominent
political
figure in Yugoslavia and
the
most
talked-about leader (in a positive or a negative sense) since
Tito, who died in May 1980. He is also considered by many to be
the first Serbian leader since the Second World War to have
defended
Serbia's
interests, albeit at the
expense
of
antagonizing some other parts of the loosely-knit federation.
Many Yugoslavs outside Serbia accordingly regard Milosevic with
apprehension and believe that he has taken advantage of Serbian
frustrations by appealing to Serbian national grievances, in
particular the position of Serbs in the restive province of
Kosovo.
Milosevic's speech at Kosovo Polje will undoubtedly
reinforce those feelings of both admiration and fear of the
47-year-old lawyer and banker turned politician.
Some aspects of Milosevic's speech are reminiscent of the
uncompromising approach he has taken in some previous speeches.
He openly assailed past leaders of Serbia, without mentioning
names, saying
'rf we lost the

battle, it was not only due to Turkish
military supremacy but also to the tragic discord at the
top of the Serbian leadership.
This discord . • • has
followed the Serbian people throughout their history,
including both
world
wars
and
later
in socialist
Yugoslavia, when the Serbian leadership remained divided
and prone to compromises at the expense of the people.

Although he has spoken in these terms before, the delivery of
this message in front of the massive crowd was effective in
suggesting that it was Serbia's current leadership, under his
direction, that had reunited Serbia.
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Supporters will find comfort in his remark that "The moment
has come when, standing on the fields of Kosovo, we can say
openly and clearly: No longer"; the implication was that the
Serbs had won a significant victory in Kosovo today and had made
it clear that it would not be the last one. This point was again
implied when Milosevic said: "Today, six centuries later, we are
again fighting a battle and facing battles. They are not armed
battles, although such things cannot yet be excluded."
This is tough talk, and some people fear that Milosevic and
his political allies may feel strengthened by the outpouring of
popular support in response to his speech and accordingly will
be even harder to deal ~ith ~t the Extraordinary 14th Congress
of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in December.
Milan Andrejevich
1

Radio Ljubljana, 28 June 1989~

5:00 P.H.

2

Politika (Belgrade), 29 and 30 June 1989; Jedinstvo (Pristina),
1989; Vjesnik {Zagreb), 29 June 1989.

3

Borba (Belgrade), 26 June 1989; AP and Reuter, 28 June 1989. Radio Zagreb
on June 30 concluded that the event on June 28 and Milosevic's "insistence
on harmony and unity . . • is frightening when it comes from the mouth of
the leader of the most numerous nation in a multinational country." The
commentary criticized Milosevic for dismissing "the contribution of the
Serbian people to the struggle for the national and social liberation of
Yugoslavia." Zagreb Television and Vjesnik also criticized Milosevic's
speech.
In response, on July 2 the pro-Milosevic daily Politika said that
attacks from Croatia amounted to nothing more than "an echo of hatred [and]
a condemnation of an entire nation and its history."

29

June
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The New Tough-Sounding Leaders in Kosovo
Summary: Two leading hard-liners in Kosovo--the
new provincial party chief Rahman Morina, and
Rexhep Hoxha, the new youth leader who has
already become a controversial figure in the
country--have
made
some
tough-sounding
statements about Kosovo's various nationality
problems in interviews and speeches. The fate of
the former provincial party leader Azem Vllasi
was discussed, as well as the controversial
issue of "isolation" and the crisis of young
people in Kosovo.

* * *
The new leadership in Kosovo, despite being incapacitated
by deep purges and lacking grass-roots support, is showing no
hesitance in trying to combat the province's almost hopeless
political, economic, and social situation.
The new leaders
obviously have the full trust and backing of the Serbian
leadership, which has had the province fully under its control
under stipulations in the constitutional amendments passed in
April. The current party chief in Kosovo, Rahman Morina, and
the new and already controversial chief of the provincial
party's youth organization, Rexhep Hoxha, have clearly shown in
interviews and meetings that they are the leading hard-liners of
the new generation of Kosovar leaders.
During the recent 600th anniversary celebrations of the
Battle of Kosovo Polje, Marina was interviewed by a large number
of Yugoslav and foreign journalists attending the event. 1 Asked
about the fate of Azem Vllasi, his predecessor who is now under
arrest and awaiting trial, Marina first replied that "he will
get what he deserves" but then hastened to add that everything
would depend on the findings of the appropriate legal bodies.
Marina was next asked about the policy of "isolation," that is,
holding people without charges or trial and subjecting them to
tough interrogations and apparently even beatings and torturec
He retorted that too much fuss had been made about this and that
the measure was constitutional; moreover, had it not been
introduced, "much more severe steps would have been necessary
today." His elaboration on the subject was probably not very
convincing to the reporters:
one cannot isolate clean and guiltless people. As a humane
person I am in principle opposed to jails and isolation,
especially of young people who are born clean; but someone
has ruined them, and this must be explained.

Before assuming the post of president of the provincial
League of Communists,
Marina
was head of the provincial
department of internal affairs; and because of this background,
Tirana has depicted him as an "obscure police chief."
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Morina also replied :.,) : .' ~;:)orters' questions about his
alleged lack of popularity by ;.~.~ying, "I just don't know who
says that I don't enjoy the ;.T{pport of the majority of the
Albanians.
I
think I do havF. their support. " He ad.mi t ted,
however, that both Albanian un.-3,tionalists" and other unnamed
enemies opposed him.
He also denied that Ibrahim Rugova, the head of the Union
of Kosovar Writers, had been jailed but warned that if Rugova
"continues in that manner," he would ~nd up before the law,
because he "threatens democracy .in Yugoslavia." Rugova is the
province's most prominent d1s,.-:.tdent an·.1 ha;3 made headlines
through his interviews to the foreign news media (the latest one
appeared in the West German weekly Der SpiP.ge1 2 ).
With regard to the anniversary celebrations, Marina said
that traditions had to be developed for a better future and for
the benefit of everyone. He said that "some small groups" from
Ferizaj, Pristina, and Gjakova had attended the event, which
seems to confirm the general impression that Kosovo's 90% ethnic
Albanian majority ignored the celebrations, which were staged as
a festival of Serbian patriotism.
Morina has recently made other statements on Kosovo's many
difficult problems.
At a meeting of the presidency of the
provincial League of Communists over which he presided, for
example, Morina discussed the crisis of young people
in
Kosovo. 3 After noting that "a considerable number" of young
people in Kosovo had engaged in "hostile nationalist activities"
since 1981, the meeting concluded that the problems there could
not be solved "through repression alone." It was said that the
"resocialization" of young people was very important but that
little had been accomplished in this regard, as could be seen
from the fact that during the latest hostile demonstrations,
"those who participated had been very extremist in their
actions, similar to their behavior in the past .. " The legal
authorities were asked to help those young people who recanted
by bringing them back into the mainstream of society "through
the reduction of jail terms and through amnesties."
Rexhep Hoxha. The Pristina daily Rilindja publi.shed an
interesting interview by another rising Kosovar leader, Rexhep
Hoxha, the President of the Kosovo Socialist Youth Alliance. 4
Hoxha is an ambitious young man who, like his predecessors
Mahmut Bakalli and Azem Vllasi before him, is being referred to
by the Yugoslav press as the province's rising new politician.
He has been in his new post barely a month and has already
aroused a controversy. On June 15 the Slovene Branko Greganovic
submitted his resignation as President of the Socialist Youth
Alliance of Yugoslavia, after the organization's Presidium
refused to censure a speech by Rexhep Hoxha, who, in line with
Serbian political thinking, accused Slovenian politicians of
causing the tense situation in Kosovo by supporti.ng Albanian
nationalists
and
of pursuing a "contemptuous
and
hazy"
5
anti-Serbian and anti-Yugoslav policyo
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From the tone of the interviewer it seems that Rilindja's
ed1tors themselves were p11.zzled about Hoxha' s background. The
article itself prominently displ~yed the rhetorical question
"Who is this man?" The dally answered its own question by saying
that
Hoxha
"has no home, is
single,
with a
Yugoslav
orientation." When asked about his nationality, he replied, in
order "to clarify some misunderstandings that have cropped up
lately," that he was a Moslem. Thj_s seems rather strange since
his name is Albanian and also because Yugoslavia's Moslem
nationals generally live in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Finally, it unclear how ~exhep Hoxha inten~A to be a rallying
force for the province's A'tbani.a.n youth by j_{1sisting that he is
of Moslem nationality.
Rilindja published the interview under the heading "I Did
Not Say that Young Slovenes Are Anti-Serb and Anti-Yugoslav" and
noted in the introduction that Hoxha continued to claim that
Rilindja had not reported "objectively" on the meeting of the
Yugoslav Youth Socialist Alliance.
In the interview Hoxha's
criticism of his Slovene counterparts did not abate:
The comrades of the Slovene delegation wanted only to
tackle
new
issues and not to talk about
concrete
cooperation. They totally rejected the current policy on
Kosovo and wanted it invalidated; and [they] demanded the
rescinding of the decision to call the 1981 and recent
events counterrevolutionary.
They wanted to hold the
Presidency of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
responsible for applying the emergency measures; they
claimed that
in
Kosovo
the
Albanians
were being
discriminated against in education; [they] talked about the
threat to the rights of the Albanians and concluded by
comparing Kosovo to Beijing and the events in China.

He continued in the very self-assured manner that has
become his trademark by saying that he was "particularly upset"
by the claims of the comrades from Slovenia that they were "more
competent [than Kosovars] to tell the truth about Kosovo." Asked
to speak about the current difficult situation in his capacity
as the leader of young Kosovars, Hoxha replied:
The most important thing for me is that the young Kosovars
see their future in Tito's Yugoslavia and not, as the
troublemakers say, in Albania. Young Kosovars are aware of
the poverty in Albania and are therefore ready through
greater
unity and determination to strive
for
the
development of Kosovo within the Yugoslav framework and not
in any other way. We possess a considerable potential to
overcome this [present] situation.

The two politicians who were interviewed are important
representatives of the present hard-line leadership of Kosovo.
It seems quite unlikely that their statements will have a major
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impact on the people in Kosovo, expecially since one of them has
even gone so far as to deny his own national background.
Louis Zanga
1

Rilindja, 29 June 1989.

2

26 June 1989.

3

}1.il (ndja, 2 July 1989.

4

Ibid., 2 July 1989.

5

See Yugoslav
1989, item 8.
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Bosnia and Macedonia Elect Yugo~lav State Presidency
Members
Summary: Voters in Yugoslavia's traditionally
conservative republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina and
Macedonia have elected new representatives to
the eight-member federal State Presidency. Both
of the new members are less than 40 years old.

* * *
On June 25 direct elections were held in Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Macedonia by secret ballot to choose who would represent the
republics in the eight-member federal State Presidency. Vasil
Tupurkovski, a 38-year-old professor of law, was elected by a
wide margin in Macedonia, while Bogie Bogicevic, a 36-year-old
political
scientist, was chosen in front of five
other
candidates in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Both men were elected six
weeks after the rest of the new State Presidency had been been
officially sworn in. Macedonia did not elect its representative
in early April because the Macedonian National Assembly was
split over the choice of a representative, and Bosnia delayed
its decision because of a political scandal.
Two other republics held
direct elections to choose
representatives for the Yugoslav State Presidency. On April 2
Slovenes elected Janez Drnovsek and rejected the officially
backed
candidate, Marko Bulc.
On April 9, in contrast,
Montenegrins chose Nenad Bucin, the officially backed candidate.
These four elections were the first since the State Presidency
was established in 1971 in which representatives were elected by
the general public. The representatives from the remaining two
republics and two autonomous provinces were elected by secret
ballot by the respective national assemblies.
Are Direct Elections Legal? Top officials, such as members
of the State Presidency, are normally chosen by indirect
election: delegates in the republican national assemblies elect
officials for higher office without holding direct elections.
There are, however, different
interpretations of Yugoslav
electoral procedure because of an apparent contradiction in the
constitution. The constitution states that public referendums
are binding but also suggests that a national assembly can
ignore the results of a public referendum.
This apparent contradiction has led members of Yugoslavia's
Constitutional Court to question the validity of the direct
elections, a
step
that
could
have
serious
political
repercussions and indicate a retreat from democratization.
On
July 5 Yugoslavia's highest court announced that it would
examine the legality of public referendums and decide whether
the republican national assemblies were obliged to endorse
candidates chosen by direct election. The assemblies of Bosnia
and Macedonia have recently confirmed the results of the
elections that were held on June 25o 1
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Tupurkovski's Background.
Tupurkovski was born in Skopje
in 1951.
He obtained a doctorate in law in 1976 from the
University of Skopje and is now a Professor of International Law
there.
He received a Master's degree from the University of
Michigan after writing a thesis on violations of human rights in
Greece by the military junta from 1967 to 1973. He joined the
League of Communists (LCY) in 1972 and served from 1979 to
December ·1980 as President of the League of Socialist Youth of
Yugoslavia.
He is
still
considered
to
have been the
organization's most unconventional leader. From May 1982 to May
1986 he was a me:m.ber of Macedonia's Central Committee (CC)
Presid.hun. At t.he 13th Congress of the LCY in June 1986, he was
elected to the CC Presidium.
Tupurkovski soundly defeated the 57-year-old Dragoljub
Stavrev by 720,976 votes (76.5%) to 188,156 (20.1%) (32,694
votes were declared invalid). Of 1,255,925 eligible voters,
942,662 (75.05%) actually voted. 2
Tupurkovski was expected to
beat Stavrev, who has been in politics for 20 years and is
currently a member of Macedonia's 9-rnember State Presidency. On
April 14 the Macedonian National Assembly failed to elect a
member to the State Presidency because of a stalemate allegedly
caused by the media's coverage. The media had criticized the
way in which the election was being conducted and the fact that,
at one stage, there had been as many as 122 candidates.
The
Macedonian
party
Presidium
accused
the
media of
"misinformation . . . aimed
at
discrediting some
of
the
candidates . . . and of providing incomplete information to the
public about certain phases of the elections." 3
Some Macedonian
national assembly delegates accused the party of trying to
influence the outcome of the assembly's secret ballot; Jakov
Lazarovski, the republic's party President and one of the two
official candidates, was expected to win the election.
Tupurkovski, a colorful figure, is known in Yugoslavia for
his mustache, casual style, and preference for polo shirts,
sweatshirts, and jeans.
While serving as President of the
Socialist Youth Alliance, the outspoken 'I upurkovski had said
that the younger members of the LCY were "obsessed with
careerism" and that many officials in the youth alliance were
lazy. In October 1988 he warned that "the position of the LCY as
a leading party in Yugoslavia was one of the sources of
Yugoslavia's problems." 4
He supports "nonparty pluralism" (a
political system without any parties) and a market-oriented
economy.
In a televised debate with Starvev on the eve of the
elections, Tupurkovski stressed that market-oriented reforms
depended
on
the
"indispensible
reintroduction
of
5
self-management."
He also sparked a controversy after he said
that a vote of no·-conf j_dence in Dusan Ckrebic, one of Serbia's
representatives on the CC Presidium, taken at the 17th CC plenum
in October 1988, was evidence of an "unprincipled coalition"
against one republic (that is, Serbia). His comment provoked not
only support from Serbia and the Vojvodina but also considerable
criticism from the majority of other party officials.
1
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Bogicevic's Background. Bogicevic was born in the village
of Ugljevik, near the Bosnian town of Bijelina. He joined the
party in 1971 and began his political career in the Bosnian town
of Tuzla.
He held nwnerous
top posts in regional youth
organizations, served as a member of the Presidium of the
Bosnian Socialist Alliance, and was a delegate to the Bosnian
National Assembly.
In May 1986 he was elected a member of
Bosnia's CC and since early 1989 has been a member. of its
Presidium ..
Bogicevic
defeated four other candidates.
All
five
candidates were Serbs, because the Bosnian National Assembly
realized that Bosnia had not been represented by a Serb on the
State Presidency since Cvijetin Mijatovic (1974-1984). The
representatives since Mijatovic have been Branko Mikulic, a
Croat, and Hamdija Pozderac and Raif Dizdarevic, both Bosnian
Moslems.
Bogicevic, who was placed third in the pre-election
polls, received 609,258 votes (33%); Dragan Kalin.ic, a Bosnian
member of the LCY CC and the party's candidate, received 439,866
votes; Bosnia Prime Minister Marko Ceranic was third with
388,272 votes; Zivko Radisic, a businessman from Banja Luka,
received 241,761 votes; and Nedjo Milicevic, a member of the
Bosnian government, received 118,722 votes. Votes were cast by
1,906,000 Bosnians--about 70% of the electorate.
More than
108,000 ballots were declared invalid. 6 Of the five candidates,
Bogicevic was widely considered by the Bosnian media to be the
most experienced politician; yet his election was a surprise
because of his age and because he was not backed by the party.
Bogicevic described the results of the election as "a victory
for the democratization of the electoral system." He also said
that he had voted for one of his four opponents. 7
Bogicevic has a Master's degree in political science and
advocates the separation of the party from the state.
On
several occasions he has demanded that the party and the state
stop interfering in economic affairs. He also thinks that a
stronger federal State Presidency would help hold Yugoslavia
together.
He advocates both the development of a
modern
market-oriented economy and a stronger federation, in other
words, a more powerful central government. He also believes
that the federation must
become
"a guarantor of a more
technologically
oriented system." He interprets
political
pluralism as the "pluralism of opinion." This would involve an
expanded role for the Socialist Alliance, the party's mass front
organization, but not a multiparty systernG
To achieve such
goals, Bogicevic had said in pre-election and postelection
interviews, his first priority would be to develop "a strong
Yugoslavia, a strong [system of] associated labor, an undivided
working class, and strong republics and provinces." Bogicevic
has also demanded a nationwide environmental protection program
and that both regional
and
federal
governments pay more
attention to environmental issues. 8

Yugoslav SR/9

18

20 July 1989

Bogicevic is also one of the men helping to rescue the
Bosnian conglomerate Agrokom~:cc ,
In August 1987 the media
revealed that the enterprise' :s :Ll,.rna.gem~nt had .issued $1 billion
worth of unbacked promissory notes with the support of some of
the republic's top party and st.1te leaders. Once considered the
best
example
of
Yugoslavia's
system
of
industrial
self-management, the company's rapidly dropping sales
and
shrinking work force forced the Bosnian government to rescue the
company.
Bogicevic recently claimed that "everything is not as
black as it seems. .
There are also good signs that things
will start moving" at Agrokomerc. 9
Bosnian Spy Scandal. Bog1cev1c 1 s victory was preceded by a
political scandal, the third major scandal in Bosnia since
August 1987. On April 11 the Bosnian Na~ional Assembly failed
to select a representative because neither candidate had won a
majority.
A third candidate--Nenad Kecmanovic, a 41-year-old,
liberal-minded professor of sociology and President of Sarajevo
University who had led in the pre-election polls and was widely
supported by the public--had withdrawn several days before the
election after being was accused by Bosnia's Ministry of
Internal Affairs of "having indiscrete contacts with foreign
intelligence agents," Western diplomats, and scholars and of
providing "detailed descriptions of events in Yugoslavia. 1110
The Bosnian Socialist Alliance issued a state~ent saying that
"Kecrnanovic does not
fulfill
the
criteria demanded from
candidates for this position." 11
Subsequently, Kecmanovic was
forbidden to run as a candidate in the elections on June 25.
Shortly thereafter, however, the Sarajevo University Conference,
which is affiliated to the Bosnian Socialist Youth Alliance,
renominated
Kecmanovic
and
repeated the claim
of
the
university's student paper
that
he had been a victim of
"backstage political deals. " 12
Bosnia's Socialist Alliance,
which is responsible for
coordinating
election procedure,
rejected the students' initiative.
Kecmanovic has repeatedly denied any wrong-doing and has
claimed that "as a university professor, I never had access to
any state secrets." In an interview in a Belgrade daily, he said
that "I have certainly done no damage to my country. I may, in
fact, have contributed to its prestige. I was accused only
after it became obvious that I was a favorite in the race. " 13
Kecmanovic
is an outspoken opponent of the
conservative
leadership in Bosnia, and his popularity among students probably
upset some key officials whom he had previously critici.zed. 14
It is worth remembering that Kecmanovic and Vojislav Seselj, a
well-known Bosnian Serb dissident now living in Zemun, were both
members of the Sociology department at Sarajevo University in
the early 1980s. Seselj's views have been sharply condemned by
both the Bosnian and the federal authorities, and in 1984 he was
sent to prison for "hostile propaganda against the state." He
was in prison for 22 months.
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The State Presidency. The collective State Presidency was
designed to prevent a power struggle among the republics after
Tito's death.
Each of Yugoslavia's six republics and two
autonomous
provinces
has a representative on the
State
Presidency; they each serve a one-year term as head of state on
a rotational basis. The rotating system was introduced during
Tito's lifetime under the constitutional amendments of 1971.
Members are elected for a term of five years and can be
re-elected for an additional five-year term. The current State
Presidency members are all eligible to stay on until May 1999.
The State Presidency .ts in charge of the Yugoslavia's armed
forces and its foreign policy.
The Socialist Alliance of Working People of Yugoslavia
(SAWPY), the party's mass front organization, has already
decided which members of the State Presidency will be given
which jobs and the order in which they will be President. The
order is as follows: Borisav Jovic (Serbia), who was President
of Serbia's National Assembly and a member of Serbia's party
Presidium, takes office in May 1990; Stipe Suvar (Croatia) a
former President of the League of Communists CC Presidiwn
follows in May 1991; Bucin (Montenegro), a member of the SAWPY
Presidium, takes office in
May
1992; Dragutin Zelenovic
(Vojvodina), a businessman and President of Novi Sad University,
follows in May 1993. If the following are re-elected in 1994,
they will also become President: Riza Sapundziju (Kosovo), an
economist and one of Yugoslavia's most widely respected bankers,
would take office in 1994; Tupurkovski (Macedonia) would follow
in 1995; and Bogicevic in 1996.
Of the eight new members of the State Presidency, only
Kosovo's representative, Sapundziju, was a member of Tito's
partisans during the Second World War.
A seat on the State
Presidency was traditionally the last major political post prior
to retirement; and until now, its members have always been from
the ranks of Tito's partisans. The average age of the new State
Presidency is 50; the average age of the previous members was
66 .
Conclusion.
The emergence of a younger generation of
politicians will not, however, be enough to solve the multitude
of economic, political, and social problems that plagued the
previous leadership. In addition, if the Supreme Court decides
that the direct election of candidates is invalid, there could
be serious political repercussions; and Yugoslavia's Wester~
creditors would probably take a dim view of such a development.
Moreover, several of the new members of the State Presidency,
such as Jovic, Suvar, and, to a lesser degree, Bucin and
Tupurkovski, have been involved in political controversies over
the last year. Now that these controversial party members have
been appointed to a state body, it is unlikely that much
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progress will be made in the short term at separating party from
state.
Milan Andrejevich
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2

Borba (Belgrade), 27 June 1989.

3

Ibid., 12 May 1989.

4

See Yugoslav Situation Report/10,
1988, item 2.

5

Tanjug, 24 June 1989.

6

Vjesnik (Zagreb), 28 June 1989; and
1989.

7

vecernje Novosti, 29 June 1989.

8

Borba (Belgrade), 14, 23, and 28 June 1989.

9

Ibid., 28 June 1989.

Radio

Free Europe Research, 11 November

vecernje

Novosti

(Belgrade), 28 June

10

Ibid., 19 April 1989; and Vecernje Novosti, 13 April 1989.

11

Borba, 21, 22, and 23 May 1989.

12

Vecernje Novosti, 30 May 1989.

13

Borba, 17 April 1989.

14

For instance, Branko Mikulic,
Pozderac and his brother Hakija.

·Milanko

Renovica,

and

the late Hamdija

20 July 1989
5.

21

Yugoslav SR/9

Imams Continue To Press for Change~
Summary:
For the fourth time
since·
last
November, reform-minded imams from Bosnia have
demanded the immediate reca.ll of the Supreme
Head of the Ruling
Council
of the Moslem

Community in Yugoslavia.

* * *
On July 3 about 70 imams (Mo~iem prayer l~adPrs and
scholars) from the Socialist Republj.c of Dn:~~nia-Her;::.~ govina
demanded the ouster of the supreme head of the.ir r~ligious
community. 1
They also
criticized
the
hierarchy for not
submitting
a
draft proposal for a new constitution
for
Yugoslavia's Islamic community. This was the fourth time since
November 1988 that imams had publicly expressed dissatisfaction
with the Islamic hierarchy.
The previous protest occurred on
February 14 and involved some 500 imams. On March 2 a special
commission established by the Islamic Supreme Ruling Council
adopted proposals for drafting a new constitution; and in April
the body announced that the supreme head, Reis-Ul-Ulema Adzi
Husein Mujic, would retire in November 1989. 2
Yugoslavia
has the largest Moslem population of any
European country except Turkey.
In the 1981 census nearly
2,000,000 people, primarily Serbo-Croatian-speaking Slavs in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, officially declared themselves of Moslem
nationality; and almost 4,000,000 Yugoslav citizens have an
Islamic background, with the vast majority of them being members
of the Sunni branch, and are of the above-mentioned Moslem
nationality, ethnic Albanians and Turks, or Gypsiese There are
almost 3,000 Mosques and 3,000 imams in Yugoslavia. The Islamic
communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia are
served by 1,200 imams; and there are three other administrative
districts: Kosovo (which includes Serbia and the Vojvodina),
Macedonia, and Montenegro.
The Controversy.
Imams from the Bosnian town of Tuzla
called for the latest protest meeting to be held in the
republican capital of Sarajevo on July 3. They submitted a
petition bearing 40 signatures calling for the "democratization
of the Islamic religious conununity," which apparently means that
they are seeking a greater voice in the day-to-day affairs of
the religious community and
the
official organization of
Yugoslavia Moslems and in the election of the
religious
leaders. 3
The imams from Tuzla urged all Bosnian imams to attend; but
only 70 turned up at the meeting, which was held in the
auditorium of the Islamic Religious community's headquarters.
The low attendance suggests that the much-talked-about power
struggle between the reform-minded imams, who are referred to as
"the imam movement," and the conservative hierarchy may have
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subsided.. In large part, this may be explained by ;~.he Snpreme
Ruling Council's acceptance of most of the demands lr(t" , .~i.anges
in the overall make-up of
the Islamic commun1ty a.nd its
hierarchy and that the feeling among the majority of imams that
the Church's hierarchy is responding to the need for changes.
7

The
latest
protest could, however, be~ result
of
dissatisfaction among a
small
faction within the reform
movement.
According to a Tanjug report, demands have also been
made for a return to traditional Islamic practices pertaining to
the behavior and dress of Moslem women, the role of the wives of
imams, and codes governing students and f,3.cul ty i(1embex·~ of
Moslem religious schools and other cultural institutionr>. 4
When the 11-member Supreme Ruling Council adopted proposals
to review the suggested
constitutional
and administrative
changes in March, it was clearly a victory for the reform-minded
imams. The reforms, if implemented, will be the most significant
changes since the late 1960s. The Council did reject the demand
for the recall of Mujic as Supreme Head, although it did support
the demand for recalling Ferhat Seta [she-ta], the President of
the 13-mernber Bosnian Islamic Assembly for Bosnia, Croatia, and
Slovenia. According to protesting imams, Seta was given "an
attractive position" within the hierarchy; press reports have
not indicated what that position was.
The imams from Tuzla did not, however, call for Mujic's
removal, although this demand was made at the July 3 protest
meeting. Mujic, the former mufti (the chief spiritual leader)
of Tuzla, has been head of Yugoslavia's Moslem community since
October 1987.
A spokesman for the Supreme Ruling Council
announced in April that Mujic had decided to step down as
Supreme Head in November. The position is normally a life-time
appointment.
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Joint Ventures
Summary: Since the start of 1989 Yugoslavia has
been trying to encourage more joint ventures.
Despite the country's economic and political
problems, new laws appear to be encouraging more
foreign investment.

* * *
While observers of Eastern Europe have recently been
focusing on political and economic liberalization in Poland and
Hungary, Yugoslavia has been intensifying its efforts to reform
its economy on market-based principles.
At a time of ethnic
conflict, personal power struggles, an inflation rate of over
700%, and a high rate of unemployment (it has reached 55% in
Kosovo), Yugoslavia has taken steps in the last year to improve
the legal rights of foreign ·investors.
A new law on foreign investment that came into force on 1
January 1989 abolished many restrictions.
Firms completely
owned by foreign companies could now receive tax breaks or even
exemption
from taxes in the first years
of
operation.
Export-oriented enterprises could also receive special export
incentives.
Foreign owned firms must still, however, be based
in the various "customs-free zones" long-established throughout
the country; and the companies will not allowed to grow very
large. In the area of joint ventures, however, the changes were
more sweeping.
Since January 1 all enterprises owned jointly by foreign
and domestic partners have enjoyed the same legal status as
purely domestic enterprises. Apparently as a result, there has
been a boom in the activity of joint ventures.
Although no
recent figures are available for the number of joint ventures in
Yugoslavia, anecdotal evidence suggests there has been a sharp
increase in their activity. By the middle of January, the
Yugoslav
authorities
claimed that the
total
value
of
construction contracts in 1989 performed outside Yugoslavia by
joint ventures involving Yugoslav companies would probably
exceed $2 billion.
In contrast, in 1988 Yugoslav builders
carried out $1o4 billion worth of construction work outside
Yugoslavia. 1
Typical of the major construction projects taking place in
Yugoslavia itself was a preliminary agreement signed in April
1989 between Hyatt (the US hotel company), The First National
Bank of Chicago, and a consortium of five Yugoslav firms to
complete a new luxury hotel, the Hyatt Regency-Belgrade. Work
had started on the hotel once before, but the project was
abandoned because of a lack of money.
The Yugoslavs say that
the hotel will open on SeptenIDer 1 even though most of the
partners in the project think
this is optimistic.
This
$50,000,000 hotel has been organized as a joint stock company
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w.i.t-,h a founding capital of $20,000,000,
51 % of which will be
prnvid~rl by Hyatt, the rest by the Yugoslav partners.
The

Ch.:L(;ago bank will provide the remaining $30,000,000.
Prof its
will be split between the partners in proportion to their
contribution of investment capital. This is the first time that
a communist government in Yugoslavia has allowed a foreign
company to be the majority owner of a joint venture. In
addition, this is the first joint venture in Yugoslavia that
will not be managed by a Yugoslav. 2
The construction industry is only one area in which the
authorJ.ties are tx:ying to encourage joint ventures. Also in
April EnergoinVP.";;t of Sarajevo signed a contract with the
American oil company Amoco to look for gas and oil in the
mountainous republic of Bosnia-Herzegovinao Amoco has reserved
the right to withdraw from the project if the search is not
successful; but if prospects of finding sufficient quantities of
oil or gas appear good enough, Amoco and Energoinvest will
exploit the reserves jointly. 3
In late May a similar agreement was reached between FAC, an
American company based in Los Angeles, and Energoinvest--11
Oktomvri (a subsidiary of Energoinvest based in Sarajevo) to
produce components for the electrical industry. Energoinvest
will provide $2,500,000 of the $3,500,000 initial capital
investment. FAC will pay the balance and provide the advanced
technology required for the enterprise. 4
On June 2 it was announced that a Chinese-Yugoslav joint
venture would soon start making clothing, largely for export to
Western Europe, in the Macedonian capital of Skopje.
The
partners in this venture are the Shanghai Garment Corporation
and Interimpeks-Promet and Makedonija Sport of Skopjee 5
Building upon these and other such joint ventures, in the
first week of June, Belgrade
invited
almost 200 Yugoslav
businessmen working temporarily or permanently abroad to a
seminar with the aim of
institutionalizing contacts between
foreign and domestic companies and of encouraging foreign
investment
in
Yugoslavia.
At
thi.s
seminar,
entitled
YU-etnobiznis, Yugoslav officials emphasized that Yugoslavia
would not reverse its market-oriented reforms. It was agreed at
the meeting that similar seminars should be held each year in
early June. The participants also decided to set up a Yugoslav
International Business Center in Belgrade to help foreign
businessmen. The business center is also to be financed as a
joint venture.s
The efforts to encourage
joint
ventures reflect the
determination of the authorities to introduce market-oriented
reforms. The Yugoslav authorities have to work hard to overcome
the skepticism and mistrust of foreigners, particularly in light
of the increasing ethnic tension in Yugoslavia. So long as the
hard-line approach of the authorities to ethnic unrest does not
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turn into a reaction against economic liberalization, the number
of joint ventures will probably continue to increase.
David Goodlett
1

Tanjug, 25 April 1989.

2

See Jedinstvo (Pristina), 17 April 1989; Politika (Belgrade),
1989; and East European Harkets (London), 5 May 1989.

3

Tanjug, 3 April 1989.

4

Ibid., 25 May 1989.

5

Ibid., 2 June 1989.

6

See Borba (Belgrade), 6 June 1989;

17 April

and Politika, 7 and 8 June 1989.

20 July 1989
7.

27

Yugoslav SR/9

Vecernje Novosti Reports on Romanian Refugees

Summary: A major Yugoslav tabloid has published
an 11-part series on the plight of Romanian
asylum seekers who use Yugoslavia in transit to
the West.

* * *
The Belgrade tabloid Vecernje Novosti recently completed
publication of an 11-part series on the plight of Romanian
refugees in Yugoslavia. 1 According to the five authors of the
articles, there has been a significant increase in the number of
Romanians fleeing as the country '·s economic and social crisis
goes from bad to worse. The articles described the great risks
involved in crossing the 557-kilometer Romanian-Yugoslav border.
Many Romanians enter illegally by swimming across the River
Danube
or hiding between the trunks and
back-seats
of
aµtomobiles or underneath them.
Some have reportedly attempted
suicide when caught by Yugoslav customs officials and police.
Background.
For the vast majority of refugees, Yugoslavia
serves as a way station. In 1988 about 4,300 refugees entered
Yugoslavia; more than 4,000 were Romanians seeking asylum. From
January through May
1989,
some
5,000
refugees entered
Yugoslavia; of these almost 4,100 were from Romania.
Some
unofficial estimates claim that about 20,000 Romanians fled in
1988, with an unspecified number going to Hungary, and that
about 2,000 either were killed by border guards or drowned in
the Danube.
In 1986 around 1,200 refugees passed through
Yugoslavia on their way to the West.
About 700 were from
Romania, 300 from Czechoslovakia, 72 from Poland, 36 from
Hungary, 16 from Albania, 16 from the GDR, 15 from Bulgaria, 4
from the Soviet Union, and a total of 41 from the People's
Republic of China, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, South Africa, the Sudan,
Ethiopia, and Algeria. 2
Yugoslavia, as a signatory to the United Nations Convention
on Refugees, is obliged to give aid and protection to those who
leave their country for political, religious, national, and
racial reasons. Yugoslav officials say that they are unable to
accept all the refugees largely because of a shortage of funds,
so that some asylum-seeking refugees are sent back to their
countries of origin.
Although Yugoslav officials admit that
they have sent back asylum-seekers, there are no official
figures; a Dutch newspaper, however, reported that Yugoslavia
returned about 90% of Romanians seeking asylurn. 3
The federal
Ministry for Internal Affairs has the final say on all matters
pertaining to the status of refugees.
All foreigners who enter Yugoslavia illegally are given
prison sentences of between 10 and 30 days; the average sentence
is 15 days, and during that period officials usually determine
whether to grant them permanent residency.
According to the
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Executive Committee for Refugees in Belgrade, refugees are
provided with health care, accommodations, and clothing for a
maximum
of
two years.
Most refugees are
given
basic
English-language training at refugee shelters, since most of
them are eventually received by the United States, Australia, or
Canada.
Romanians' Experiences.
According to officials of the
Executive Connnittee for Refugees, Romanians constitute the
largest number of foreigners seeking asylum; they are also
reportedly
the
least
troublesome and
even
the
most
disciplined." The series of articles in Vecernje Novosti gave
details about several successful and unsuccessful escapes. One
Romanian, for example, got away by floating across the Danube
holding on to an empty natural gas canister. It is not unconunon
for Romanians to flee to Yugoslavia dressed only in swimming
trunks and bringing no other possessions with them. Some are
hidden in automobiles, usually in the undercarriages. During the
weekend of June 23-25, 11 Romanians swam across the Danube in
the Kladovo region; they are currently serving 20-day jail
sentences
in
the
town
of
Negotin
near
the
Yugoslav-Romanian-Bulgarian border.
Officials say that the 11
will be granted temporary residency on their release.
11

Some Romanians have attempted suicide when caught by the
Yugoslav police. Three young people (two males and a female)
from Timisoara, for example, entered the country illegally at
Moravita. The two men swallowed poison and the woman was
prevented
from doing so by the police.
After a
short
convalescence in a hospital in Vrsac, all three were returned to
Romania.
One Romanian gave an account of his first unsuccessful
attempt to escape.
After being sent back to Moldavia by
Yugoslav officials, he told Vecernje Novosti, he had been fined
1,100 lei; he had earned 2,000 lei a month. He said that some
Romanians had been beaten by the authorities after th~ir return
and some had been imprisoned; he added, however, Lhat it was
"simply
not true that Romanians have been executed
for
attempting to seek asylum."
There are believed to
be
eight
refugee shelters in
Yugoslavia, all within twenty kilometers of Belgrade.
The
articles mentioned three
shelters;
Camp Kosutnjak, Banja
Koviljaca, and the largest refugee shelter known as the "Motel
of 1,000 Roses," which is 10 kilometers south of Belgrade, near
Mount
Avala.· According to the motel
director,
Radosav
Samardjic, the average stay for refugees "is about one or t~Jo

months;

a few even stay more than a year; and the longest

stay

was by a Romanian who waited two years before emigrating to the
West." Samardjic said that it was not uncommon for the motel to
take in families with two or three children.
In the past two
months six babies had been born to refugees staying at the
motel. The motel has 160 beds and is a B-class establishment.

20 July 1989

29

Yugoslav SR/9

The typical hotel menu consists of a breakfast with bread,
butter, and jam; tea and milk; and occasionally eggs, salami, or
meat paste. The lunch menu for June 8 was soup and moussaka
(egg plant and ground beef) and on June 9, soup and cabbage with
beef; there is sometimes fruit or cake for desserto
Conclusion. It is interesting that some Yugoslav newspapers
are only now writing about the highly sensitive topic of
Romanian refugees. Until a few years ago, Yugoslav-Romanian
economic and political relations were sound, largely because
Josip Broz Tito had built his Balkan policy around his personal
relationship with Nicolae
Ceausescu.
Matters subsequently
soured, because the Yugoslavs increasingly disliked Ceausescu's
treatment of the Yugoslav minorities and found his style of rule
anachronistic; Ceausescu seems to view post-Tito Yugoslavia as
an unreliable partner without effective leadership.
Milan Andrejevich
1
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CORRECTIONS AND ADDITIONS
to Yugoslav SR/8, RFER, 27 June 1989,
Item 6, page 26, second full paragraph, line 11 should read
as follows:
"Serbo-Croatian or Croato-Serbian" language.

.!....!...!. '

Item 7, page 29, paragraph beginning with Maltreatment
line 1 should read as follows:

of

Mladina is the first youth publication
also add to footnote 1, line 5 after bananas:
The Zagreb weekly Danas, no. 380, 30 May 1989, published an interview with
Agim Vllasi, a 31-year-old ethnic Albanian driver from Kosovska Kamenica
who was released from isolation on May 15 after spending 49 days in detention. The Hladina interview is strikingly similar to Vllasi's account. Agim
is the nephew of Azem Vllasi, former President of the Kosovo provincial
party Presidium, who is currently being held in detention while charges
are being drawn up for the crime of "counterrevolutionary activities.

